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ABSTRACT 
A nonaxiomatic reasoning system is an adaptive system that works with insufficient 
knowledge and resources. At the beginning of the paper, three binary term logics are 
defined. The first is based only on an inheritance relation. The second and the third 
suggest a novel way to process extension and intension, and they also have interesting 
relations with Aristotle's yllogistic logic. Based on the three simple systems, a nonax- 
iomatic logic is defined. It has a term-oriented language and an experience-grounded 
semantics. It can uniformly represent and process randomness, fuzziness, and igno- 
rance. It can also uniformly carry out deduction, abduction, induction, and revision. 
KEYWORDS: Insufficient knowledge and resources, nonaxiomatic logic and 
reasoning system, term logic, experience-grounded semantics, measure- 
ments of uncertainty, revision, deduction, abduction, induction. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A nonaxiomatic reasoning system (NARS) is proposed as a formal model 
of intelligent reasoning systems [40]. 
A reasoning system, in its general form, has the following components 
[5, 34]: 
1. a domain-independent formal language by which the system can 
communicate with its environment, hat is, to get knowledge and 
questions, and to provide answers according to its knowledge; 
2. a semantics that shows (in principle) how to understand and deter- 
mine the meaning of the terms and the truth value of the sentences 
in the language; 
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3. a set of formal inference rules that generate valid (according to the 
semantics) conclusions from given premises; 
4. a memory that serves as a storage of knowledge and questions, and a 
working place as well; 
5. a control mechanism that chooses premises and rule(s) in each 
inference step to answer the questions. 
The first three components can be called a "logic," in the broad sense of 
this term [37]. 
As an intelligent system, NARS is designed to be an adaptive system 
under the constraints that its knowledge and resources are usually insuf- 
ficient to answer the questions proposed by the environment [40, 42]. 
Concretely, it has the following features: 
Finite. The system works with respect o its constant information pro- 
cessing capacity. 
Real-time. New knowledge and questions can arrive at any time, and 
questions have time requirements attached. 
Open. No constraint is put on the knowledge and questions that the 
system can encounter, as long as they are expressible in the formal 
language. 
Adaptive. The system self-improves its behaviors under the assumption 
that its future experience will be similar to its past experience, where 
the "experience" of the. system is indicated by its history of communi- 
cation with its environment. 
What follows from the above requirements is: the system needs to 
represent and process various types of uncertainty, and to generate 
plausible answers according to its experience. Therefore, the traditional 
logic systems, such as first-order predicate logic, cannot be applied. 
Though there are already many approaches that are designed to deal 
with uncertain or incomplete knowledge, none of them is completely 
based on the "insufficiency of knowledge and resources" assumption, 
defined by the above features. 
This paper can be seen as the first step of the NARS project. In the 
following sections, we start by defining an inheritance relation, and then 
three simple logics based on it. They provide a formal foundation on 
which the simplest nonaxiomatic logic, NAL1, can be defined. NAL1 
handles multiple types of uncertainty (such as randomness, fuzziness, 
ignorance, and so on), as well as multiple types of inferences (such 
as revision, deduction, abduction, induction, and so on), in a unified 
manner. 
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2. THREE SIMPLE SYSTEMS 
2.1. Inheritance Logic 
The four logics discussed in this paper are all term logics, which are 
different from predicate logics by having the following features [4, 13]: 
1. Each proposition consists of a subject term and a predicate term, 
which are related by a copula. 
2. The copula is intuitively interpreted as "to be." 
3. The basic inference rules take two propositions that share a common 
term as premises, and get a conclusion from them, in which the other 
two (unshared) terms are related by a copula. 
In the simplest case, there is only one type of copula in the system, and 
all the terms are "atomic," that is, have no internal structure. In this way, 
we get an inheritance logic (IL). 
DEFINITION 2.1 A term is a string of letters in an alphabet. 
DEFINITION 2.2 The inheritance relation " E ," is a reflexive and transi- 
tive relation between two terms. 
DEFINITION 2.3 A proposition consists of two terms related by the 
inheritance relation. In a proposition "S E P," S is the subject erm, and P 
is the predicate term, of the proposition. 
The intuitive meaning of the inheritance relation is closely related to 
many well-known relations, for instance, "ISA" (in a semantic network), 
"belongs to" (in Aristotle's yllogism), "subset" (in set theory), or "inheri- 
tance assertion" (in an inheritance network [35]), as well as many relations 
studied in psychology and philosophy, such as "type-token," "category-in- 
stance," "general-specific," and "superordinate-subordinate" [7].What 
makes it different from the others is: it is a relation between two terms, 
and the relation is completely defined by the two properties reflexivity and 
transitivity. 1 
This logic (as well as the following two) can be interpreted in the usual 
model-theoretic way. Terms have no meaning until a model is set up, 
where they are mapped into objects in a domain, and the inheritance 
relation is also mapped into a (reflexive and transitive) relation in the 
1The membership relation "~ " cannot be represented in IL, though it can be introduced in 
the extensions of IL [40]. Therefore, the subject of a proposition cannot be a "singular term," 
such as "Tweety" or "Socrates." On the other hand, as in Aristotle's logic, "the same term 
may be used as a subject and as a predicate without any restriction" [24]. 
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domain. Such a mapping ive the terms "meaning." A proposition is "true" 
if and only if the two corresponding objects really have the relation in the 
domain. 
Under such an interpretation, "valid inference rules" are the rules that 
produce true conclusions from true premises. Obviously, there are exactly 
two valid rules, corresponding to reflexivity and transitivity, respectively. 
With these two rules, from any nonempty and finite set of propositions 
K (as premises), the following algorithm can generate the set of all valid 
conclusions K*: 
1. Let K* =K.  
2. For each term T appearing in K*, put "T r- T" in K (if it is not 
already there). 
3. For each pair of propositions "S r- M"  and "M = P" in K*, put 
"S E P"  in K* (if it is not already there). 
When IL is implemented in a reasoning system, two types of questions 
can be answered according to a given K (as premises): 
? 
Evaluation. "S r-- p", that is, "Is there an inheritance relation from S 
to P?" 
Selection. "? r-- p"  (or "S E ?"), that is, "Which term has an inheritance 
relation to P (or from S)?" 
To answer the questions, the system can simply generate K*, then 
search for a proposition with the form "S E P." 
Obviously, both types of question are decidable. For the evaluation 
question, the system will answer "Yes" when "S E P"  is in K*, other- 
wise, "No" (so the system works under the "closed-world assumption"); 
for the selection questions, the system will answer "X" when there is a 
X that has the desired relation with S (or P). X cannot be S (or P) 
itself--that would be trivial, and if there is more than one answer, any 
one of them is fine. If there is no such a term, the answer is "No." 
The system can also be described in terms of a network. K can be 
represented by a directed graph, where terms are nodes and inheritance 
relations are directed links (say, from the subject o the predicate). The 
questions are search problems either for the existence of a path from a 
given node to another given node (evaluation) or for a node in a path 
from (or to) a given node (selection). 
We have already got a complete reasoning system. Although IL is 
quite simple (even trivial) by itself, we will see that this logic provides a 
solid ground for its successors. 
2.2. Extension and Intension 
In IL, the extension and intension of a term are defined, relative to a set 
of propositions K, as the following: 
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DEFINITION 2.4 The extension of  a term T is the set of  terms E r = {x I 
(x ~ T) ~ K*}. The intension of T is the set of  terms I r = {z l (T  E x) E 
K*}. 2 
This definition is of great importance. Traditionally, extension and inten- 
sion refer to two aspects in the meaning of a term: its instances and its 
properties. Extension is usually defined as an object, or a set of objects, 
which is in a "physical world," and denoted by the term; intension is 
usually defined as a concept, which is in a "Platonic world," and denoting 
the term [4, 19]. In spite of the differences among the exact ways the two 
worlds are used by different authors, they indicate relations between a 
term in a language and something outside the language. However, in the 
current theory, they are defined as (the two sides of) a relation between 
two terms, which is within the language, and the definition still keeps the 
intuitive senses that extension refers to "instances," and intension refers to 
"properties." We can see why such a definition is appropriate when the 
major result of the paper, NAL1, is discussed. 
For now, let us simply accept the definition and its implications, which 
are: 
1. Extension and intension are defined in such a symmetric way that for 
any result about one of them, there is a dual result about the other. 
2. Each proposition reveals part of the intension for the subject term 
and part of the extension for the predicate term. 
3. Since the inheritance relation is reflexive, all terms have a nonempty 
extension and a nonempty intension--at least they have the term 
itself in them. 
From the definition, it is not difficult to get the following results (where 
"~ " means "if and only if"): 
(S E P )  ¢* (E  s c_ Ep) *~, (lp c_ Is) , 
(E  s = E e) ¢~ ( I  s = Ie).  
The first one means that "There is an inheritance relation from S to P"  is 
identical with "S inherits P's intension" and "P inherits S's extension." 
This is the reason that "E  " is called the "inheritance relation. ''3 The 
second one shows that the extension and intension of a term are mutually 
determined. Therefore, given one of them, the other can be uniquely 
obtained. 
2The extension and intension of a term are ordinary sets, but a term itself is not a set. 
3Here "inheritance" is used for a logical relation between two terms, rather than an idea 
about the implementation of a knowledge base, by which storage space can be saved 17, 35]. 
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2.3. Extensional Term Logic 
In IL, we only distinguish two types of relation between the extensions 
of two terms: whether one is completely included in the other. Now let's 
consider other possible binary relations between the extensions of two 
terms S and P. 
As sets, if E s c_ E e (or Ee ~ Es), then such a complete and affirmative 
inheritance of extension can be represented and processed by IL, defined 
as above. How about partial or negative inheritance relations between the 
extensions of two terms? A successor of IL, extensional term logic (ETL), is 
defined to capture these relations. 
By introducing four types of copulas, the following definition naturally 
extends the "r- " relation defined in IL: 
DEFINITION 2.5 
SEa P if and only if  E s - E e = O,  
S E e P i f  and only if  E s A E e = 0 ,  
S t -  i P if  and only if  E s A E e4 :0 ,  
S E o P if  and only if  E s - E e * 0 .  
They can be understood as "All S are P," "No S is P," "Some S are 
P," and "Some S are not P", respectively. 
Since (E  s - E e = 0)  ¢, (E  s c_ Ep), we have (S C a P) '~, (S E e). 
Though described differently, ETL turns out to be isomorphic with 
Aristotle's yllogistic logic. For each property of Aristotle's logic [1, 24, 28], 
there is a corresponding one in ETL, and vice versa. 
The square of  opposition. The relations among the four types of exten- 
sional inheritance can be represented in Figure 1 [4], where there are 
four types of relations: 
1. If "S E a P"  is true, then "S E i P "  is true; if "S I-- e P"  is true, 
then "S E o P"  is true. 
3 
Sr -6P~ ~ SE ,  P 
SC~P • , S r -oP  
Figure L The square of opposition. 
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2. “S c, P” and “S c, P” must be one true and one false; “S C, P” 
and “S ci P” must be one true and-one false. 
3. “S c, P” and “S II, P” cannot both be true. 
4. “S ci P” and “S C, P” cannot both be false. 
Conuersion. If “S Ce P” is true, so is “P C, S”; if “S Ci P” is true, so 
is “P ri S.” 
Syllogisms. For each valid syllogism in Aristotle’s logic, there is a corre- 
sponding (valid) inference rule in ETL. All of the rules are listed in 
Table 1. 
All of these properties can be proven from the definitions by reason- 
ing according to set theory. 
Although the four types of proposition are defined in terms of 
extensions, which are defined by the inheritance relation “ c ,” the 
above rules make ETL directly applicable to a set of “extensional 
propositions” (of the four types), and use “ c ” only for the purpose of 
interpretation. In this way, IL is both a metasystem of ETL (because the 
former is used to define the basic components of the latter) and a 
subsystem of ETL (because the “ c ” relation is identical to the “c~” 
relation). 
When implemented in a reasoning system to solve domain problems, 
the premises must be consistent. It is possible for the system itself to 
determine whether a given finite set of propositions is consistent by 
exhausting its implications, then checking for the second and third type 
of relations in the square of opposition. 
Compared with IL, the questions that ETL can answer are more 
complicated: 
Evaluation. “S r& P” now has five possible answers, corresponding to the 
four relations and “I don’t know” (undetermined), respectively. If 
both “S c, P” and “S ci P” (or “S C, P” and “S C, P”) are got, 
the former is reported as the result; if both “S ~~ P” and “S C, P” 
are got, they are reported together. 
Selection. The four different relations correspond to four kinds of ques- 
tions. When there are multiple answers, any one is equally good as 
the result. When no such term can be found, “No” is the reply. 
The questions are still decidable, because an answer will be provided 
in finite time for every question. 
The system can be described in terms of a network, too. Now there 
are four different types of links in the network, corresponding to the 
four kinds of inheritance relations. 
If only the relations “S C~ P” and “S ce P” are represented and 
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processed, ETL will degenerate into a special case, which is identical 
with the "monotonic inheritance network" defined in [10]. 
2.4. lntensional Term Logic 
Since extension and intension are defined as "dual" in IL, we get an 
intensional term logic (ITL) "for free," which is isomorphic with ETL. 
DEFINITION 2.6 
S E "P if and only if Ii~ - Is = @, 
S ~ ep if and only if I t, A I s, = @, 
S E ip if and only if I e A I s ~: •, 
S r-op if and only if Ip - I s 4= @. 
These propositions can be interpreted intuitively as "S has all of the 
properties of P," "S has none of the properties of P," "S has some of the 
properties of P," and "S lacks some of the properties of P," respectively. 
Here, the quantifiers are applied to the properties (intension) of the 
predicate, rather than to the instances (extension) of the subject (as 
Aristotle did) or predicate (as Bentham and Hamilton did; see [4]). 
The propositions represented in this way are closely related to "typical- 
ness" [31], "representativeness" [36], "normality" [20], and "fuzziness" [45]. 
All these concepts are proposed, from different standing points, to capture 
the phenomenon that an instance does (or doesn't) possess all (or some) 
properties of a category. The related problems cannot be properly repre- 
sented and processed by any extensional logic. 
ITL has isomorphic properties with ETL, such as (S E ap) ¢~. (S E P), 
the same square of oppositions, and identical conversion rules for the 
"E  e,, and "r--/" relations. As a result, we know that (S cap)  ~ (S r -  p), 
as well as (S r -op) ,~ (S E o P). However, "S r-ep" and "S I-" e P" are 
different, and so are "S r- ip,, and "S Ei P." 
The inference-rule table of ITL, Table 2, is isomorphic to that of ETL 
(they are symmetric about the main diagonal). 
Though nothing new technically, ITL suggests a simple and psychologi- 
cally plausible way to process intensions. Also in this way, extension and 
intension are naturally related. 
3. NONAXIOMATIC LOGIC 1: SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX 
3.1. Experience-Grounded Semantics 
Though IL, ETL, and ITL have interesting properties, they are still 
"axiomatic logics" in the following senses: 
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Table 2. Inference rules of ITL 
J Ja =MrapMr-~PMr ip  Mr°PPr '~MPr - -~M Pr- iM Pr°M 
Sr--~ M St - "  p sc i  p S r  -i P S r - i  P 
S r -~ M S r-e P S c ° P S r ° P S c ° P 
S r -i M S r-i P 
S r -° M S r° P 
M r -a S S l"-e P S r-° P S r --i P S re P 
M r'e S S r --e P S r-° P S r-° P S r-° P 
M r -i S S r-i P 
Mr -° S 
1. They use a model-theoretic semantics, by which "true" is defined as 
"isomorphic with the state of affairs (in a model)." 
2. A finite set of premises, whose truthfulness is presupposed by the 
system, is used as the start point of all inferences. 
3. The inference rules are valid in the sense that they only derive true 
conclusions from true premises. 
4. The system answers questions by constructing a proof from the 
premises to the desired proposition, and the choice of premises and 
rules in each step is determined by an algorithm. 
5. All the resources requirements of the algorithm can be satisfied, and 
the answer to a question is defined independently of its time-space 
resource xpense. 
Axiomatic logics work well in many domains, especially in mathematics, 
but they require sufficient knowledge and resources with respect to the 
problems to be solved. Specially, the premises must imply the desired 
answers, and the system must have enough time-space resources to actu- 
ally derive out those answers. 
What should a system do if the above requirements cannot be satisfied? 
In the following, a "nonaxiomatic logic," NAL1, is defined, which works 
with insufficient knowledge and resources. Of course, in such a situation 
no correct answer can be guaranteed. However, if a system has to work in 
such a situation, then some answers are still better than arbitrary guesses 
or always saying "I don't know." 
Since NARS is designed to be adaptive, it makes judgments based on its 
experience, although such judgments may conflict with the system's future 
experience. 4 
4In the first three systems, the name "proposition" is used for a binary assertion. In the last 
system, the name "judgment" is used for a multivalued assertion. The former can be seen as 
a special case of the later. 
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In the working environment of NARS, as defined in the introduction of 
the paper, model-theoretic semantics cannot be applied. If "truth value" is 
still used to indicate whether (or to what degree) a judgment is mapped 
exactly into an "objective state of affair," then no judgment can get such a 
truth value. However, we have reason to argue (though I prefer not to 
discuss the philosophical issues here) that in everyday life and empirical 
science, where we do suffer from the insufficiency of knowledge and 
resources, whether (or to what degree) a judgment is "true" is determined 
by comparing it with the experience of the system (a human being or a 
scientists community) to see whether (or to what degree) the judgment is 
supported by the experience. 
If this is the case, can we simply give up the idea of truth value, and 
label each judgment concretely with its positive (confirmative) and negative 
(refutive) evidence in the system's experience? This is impossible, because 
the system may not have the resources to do it, and more importantly, the 
evidence needs to be summarized for various operations. To summarize 
information about evidence into truth values causes information loss, but 
it is absolutely necessary for the system, because qualitatively different 
evidence needs to be treated in a unified manner [26]. 
This will lead to what I call "experience-grounded s mantics," where the 
truth value of a judgment indicates the degree to which the judgment is 
supported by the system's experience. Defined in this way, truth value is 
system-dependent a d time-dependent. Different systems may have con- 
flicting opinions, due to their different experiences. Even for the same 
system, truth values of judgments are constantly reevaluated according to 
new experience. 
Concretely, let us assume the experience of the system is represented by 
a sequence of input judgments E = (Jl, J2,--., Jn), where all the judg- 
ments are sentences of the communication language L, and their truth 
values are determined in the interaction of the system and the environ- 
ment. They are used as primary premises by the system) 
Comparing E with the premise set K defined in the previous axiomatic 
logics, we can see two fundamental differences: 
1. K is constant, but E changes from time to time. 
2. K must be consistent, but E is not necessarily, that is, there may be a 
pair of judgments Ji and Jj which assign different ruth values to the 
same relation. 
5Accurately speaking, the experience of a system also includes questions asked by the 
environment. Though the questions influence the resource distribution of the system, they do 
not affect the evaluation of a truth value; therefore they are ignored here. 
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Someone may suggest reating E as an ordinary "knowledge base": 
when each piece of new knowledge arrives, the previous judgments that 
conflict with it are removed. Such a method assumes the system always has 
sufficient resources to find all conflicts among judgments, and new knowl- 
edge is always superior to old knowledge. However, the first assumption 
cannot be accepted by NARS, and neither can the second one--"old" and 
"new" knowledge may come from distinct sources, and therefore we 
cannot treat all conflicts as "updating." 
What makes things more complicated is the fact that, also because of 
the insufficiency of resources, it is impossible for the system to take the 
complete E into account when evaluating the truth value of a judgment. 
As a result, truth values are usually determined according to a section of 
E. This is another source of conflicts among the judgments. Because ach 
judgment is only supported by partial experience of the system, judgments 
summarized from different sections of the experience may conflict with 
each other. 
It is possible, in theory, to use binary logic in this situation. For example, 
we can distinguish four types of judgments, based on the given experience 
E, by whether it has positive and negative vidence (as in ETL and ITL). 
However, such a logic is too weak. For the system to be adaptive, the 
weight (or amount) of evidence is important. A judgment hat has been 
confirmed one thousand times should clearly win a competition with a 
judgment hat has been confirmed only once. When a judgment has both 
positive and negative evidence, a quantitative comparison is necessary. 
Otherwise, the system will be unable to make a choice among competing 
answers for a question--they may be all marked as "possible." 
Now, since the truth value of a judgment is actually a measurement of
the positive and negative vidence, then what we need to do is: 
1. to concretely define the positive and negative evidence for a judg- 
ment, and 
2. to define a measurement unit. 
These problems are hard for predicate logics (as revealed by the famous 
"Raven paradox" of Hempel [8]), but in a term logic like NAL1, we can 
find a natural solution of them. 
In summary, the truth value of a judgment in NAL1 is a numerical 
representation i dicating the weights of positive and negative evidence, 
according to (part of) the experience of the system. However, experience is
nothing else but a string of judgments, with their truth values, too. So we 
seem to be defining a truth value circularly through other truth values. 
This is why we first introduced a simple system IL in the previous 
section. We will build NAL1 as an extension of IL, and use propositions in 
IL to construct an "ideal experience" for each judgment in NAL1, so as to 
break the definition circle. 
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Alike in IL, ETL, and ITL, in NAL1, what is represented in each 
judgment is still "to what extent one term can be used as another," or the 
inheritance relation between the extensions and intensions of two terms. 
However, as discussed before, the a, e, i, o relations in ETL and ITL need 
to be extended to a numerical measurement. For this purpose, a new 
inheritance relation "c  " is introduced as a refined version o f "  E ," and a 
judgment "S c P"  still indicates that "S inherits P's intension, and P 
inherits S's extension." 
For such a judgment, what is its positive or negative vidence? Obvi- 
ously, if (according to the experience of the system) there is a term T in 
the extensions (or intensions) of both S and P, then it provides positive 
evidence for the judgment; on the other hand, if there is a term T in the 
extension of S, but not in the extension of P, or it is in the intension of P, 
but not in the intension of S, then it provides negative vidence for the 
judgment. According to the practice of statistics, the most natural way to 
calculate the weight of evidence is to simply count such terms. In this way, 
weight o f  evidence takes its values in [0, ~], and is additive when combining 
two pieces of evidence from distinct sources [32, 41]. 
If the experience of the system is represented by a string of propositions 
in IL, then, by using the string as the premise set K, we can determine 
extension and intension for each term. For each judgment "S c P"  in 
NAL, its truth value can be represented by two of the three weights of 
evidence: w + (positive evidence), w- (negative evidence), and w (total 
evidence). 
DEFINITION 3.7 
w += tE s N Eel + II e n lsl, 
w-= IE s - Eel + lip -- Is[, 
w = w++ w-= IEsl + Ilel. 
Though any two of the three can do the job, we will use the {w +, w} pair 
in the following as the truth value of a judgment. 
It must be emphasized that what we provide here is not a method for 
practically calculating the truth value for every judgment, but a way to 
explain what a truth value means.  For a reasoning system, the truth values 
of input judgments are usually determined by the environment (which may 
be a human user, another computer system, or a sensory device), and the 
truth values of derived judgments are recursively determined by inference 
rules from the judgments used as premises. No matter how a truth value is 
practically generated, we need a unified interpretation for it, so as to make 
the numbers understandable and the inference rules justifiable. 
294 Pei Wang 
In NAL1, a judgment "S c P {w÷,w} '' can be generated by many 
different experience sections, but it is always explained as "The judgment 
is true to the extent as if it has been checked w times (by testing terms in 
S's extension or in P's intension), and the inheritance relation holds in w ÷ 
of them." In this way, we get a measurement that can be uniformly applied 
to extensional evidence and intensional evidence. In more general cases, w 
and w + are not necessarily integers, but they must satisfy w > w+> 0. 
Because the system is always open to new knowledge, w and w + have no 
upper bounds. When w += w and w --* ~, "S c P {w +, w}" will infinitely 
approach "S r- P" - - that  is, there is no, and will be no, negative vidence 
for the inheritance relation. Therefore, "c  " is a "weak version" of "r- ," 
where the latter representing a highly idealized inheritance relation be- 
tween two terms in a closed world, while the former is based on limited 
subjective xperience of an open system. 
Now it is the time to review what we have done: The simple system IL is 
introduced to make NAL1 easily understandable. Propositions in IL are so 
simple that they are "self-evident"; then a judgment in NAL1 is explained 
as a summary of a section of "ideal experience," represented by a string of 
IL propositions, though practically it is not generated in that way. 
3.2. Measurements of Uncertainty 
As truth value, weight of evidence is also a measurement of uncertainty. 
Though in principle all the information that we want to put into a truth 
value is representable in the {w+,w} pair, that is not always natural or 
convenient for the purpose of NARS. Instead of using "absolute measure- 
ments," we often prefer "relative measurements" of uncertainty, such as 
real numbers in [0, 1]. Fortunately, it is easy to define them as functions of 
weight of evidence. 
DEFINITION 3.8 The frequency of a judgment, f ,  is defined as w + /w.  
f indicates the "success frequency" of the inheritances (of extension and 
intension) between the two terms, according to the experience of the 
system. Obviously, this measurement is closely related to probability and 
statistics, and often appears in our everyday life. However, it is still 
different from probability under the traditional interpretations (logical, 
frequentist, and subjective; see [21]), because it is determined by finite 
empirical evidence. 
Another basic difference between probability and frequency is: probabil- 
ity is traditionally interpreted as being about extensions of sets. For 
example, if we say "the probability of 'S c P '  is p," it is usually understood 
as IS n PI/ISI = p. However, as described earlier, frequency (in NAL1) is 
about both extensional and intensional relations of the two terms. There- 
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fore, it can be used to process phenomena like fuzziness, typicalness, and 
so on. [39] is a detailed description of how to interpret fuzziness and 
represent i in NARS. 
To represent a truth value by a frequency value is not enough for 
NARS: we still need the information about the absolute value of w to 
manage the revision of the frequency [38]. Can we find a natural way to 
represent his information in the form of a "relative measurement," or 
specifically, as a ratio? 
An attractive idea is to define it as the "second-order p obability." The 
frequency defined above can be referred to as an estimate of "the 
first-order probability," and the second-order probability is used to repre- 
sent how good the estimation is. Actually, several approaches are working 
along this line [14, 15, 27]. However, there are problems in how to 
interpret he second value, and how it helps in the related operations [23, 
29]. At least under the assumption of insufficient knowledge, it makes little 
sense to talk about the "probability" that "the frequency is an accurate 
estimation of an 'objective first-order probability' of the inheritance rela- 
tion." With insufficient knowledge, we not only cannot know whether an 
inheritance relation will always be kept in the future, but also cannot know 
its "probability of success," in the sense of "the limit of the experienced 
frequency." For the same reason, we cannot know how close a given 
estimate is to the "objective first-order probability," or even whether there 
is such an "objective probability" as the limit of the frequency. Generally 
speaking, since the system is open, it is useless to compare the amount of 
relevant past experience, measured by w, with the future experience, 
which is (potentially) infinite: the ratio is always 0. 
However, it makes perfect sense to talk about the "near future." What 
the system needs to know, by keeping the information about w, is how 
sensitive a frequency will be to new evidence; it can then use the informa- 
tion to make a choice among competing judgments. If we limit our 
attention to a "constant future," we can keep such information in a ratio 
form. 
Let us introduce a positive constant k, and say it indicates that by "near 
future," we mean "testing the inheritance relation k more times," or 
identically, "until the weight of the new evidence reaches k." Then we can 
define a new measure--confidence. 
DEFINrrION 3.9 The confidence of a judgment, c, is defined as w/ (w + k). 
Intuitively, confidence is the ratio of the weight of "current relevant 
evidence" to the weight of "relevant evidence in the near future." It 
indicates how much the system knows about the inheritance relation, so it 
is similar to Shafer's "reliability" [33] or Yager's "credibility" [44]. Since k 
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is a constant, the more the system knows about the inheritance relation 
(represented by a bigger w), the more confident he system is about the 
frequency, since the relative effect of evidence that comes in the near 
future will be smaller (we'll see how c actually works in the revision 
operation in the next section). For our current purpose, k can be any 
positive number. 
Though c is in [0, 1], can be explained as a ratio, and/s  at a higher level 
than f in the sense that it indicates the stability of f ,  it cannot be 
interpreted as a second-order probability in the sense that it is the 
probability of the judgment "the (real, or objective) probability of the 
inheritance relation is f ,"  and cannot be processed in that way according 
to probability theory. The higher the confidence, the harder it is for the 
frequency to be changed by new evidence, but this does not mean that the 
judgment is "truer," or more "accurate," as some psychologists mean by 
the concept "confidence" [12]. 
It is easy to calculate w and w ÷ from f and c; therefore the truth value 
of a judgment can also be represented as a pair of ratios ( f ,  c) [38]. 
Amazingly, there is a third way to represent a truth value in NALI: as 
an interval [41]. Let us first define two measures. 
DEFINITION 3.10 The lower frequency of a judgment, l, is defined 
as w+/(w + k); the upper frequency of a judgment, u, is defined as 
(w++ k)/(w + k). 
Here k is the same constant introduced above. Obviously, no matter 
what will happen in the near future, the "success frequency" will be in the 
interval [l,u] after the constant period. This is because the current 
frequency is w+/w, so in the "best" case, when all evidence in the near 
future is positive, the new frequency will be (w++ k)/(w + k); in the 
"worst" case, when all evidence in the near future is negative, the new 
frequency will be w+/(w + k). 
This measurement shares similar intuition with other interval ap- 
proaches [5, 22, 43]. For example, "ignorance," i, can be represented by 
the width of the interval (here it happens to be 1 - c, so ignorance and 
confidence are complementary to each other). However, in NAL1 the 
interval is defined as the range the frequency will have in the near future, 
rather than in the infinite future. In this way, some theoretical problems 
can be avoided. For example, as discussed in connection with the "second- 
order probability," it is also impossible for an open system to determine 
such an interval for the infinite future. So the interval will be processed 
differently from those interpreted as "lower/upper bounds of (objective) 
probability." For example, during revision, two intervals that have no 
common subinterval still can be combined. 
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Now we have three functionally identical ways to represent a truth 
value: 
1. as a pair of weights {w+,w}, where w > w~>_ 0; 
2. as a pair of ratios ( f ,  c ) ,  where f ~ [0, 1] and c ~ [0, 1]; or 
3. as an interval [l, u], where 0 < l < u < 1. 
Because NARS is designed under the assumption of insufficient knowl- 
edge and resources, all the judgments within the system are supported by 
finite evidence, that is, w is positive and finite. When truth values are 
represented by the other two forms, this requirement becomes l < u, 
u - l< l ,  and0<c<l ,  
Beyond the normal truth values, there are two limit points useful for the 
interpretation of truth values and the definition of inference rules: 
Nul l  evidence. This is represented by w = 0, or c -- 0, or u - l = 1. It 
means that the system actually knows nothing at all about the 
inheritance relation. 
Total evidence. This is represented by w --, % or c = 1, or 1 = u. It 
means that the system already knows everything about the statement 
- -no  future modification of the truth value is possible. In particular, 
(S c P (1,1)) ¢* (S r- p). 
The one-to-one mappings among the three truth-value forms are 
listed in Table 3. 
This table can be easily extended to include w- (the weight of 
negative vidence), i (1 - c, degree of ignorance), and e (expectation, to
Table 3. Relations among Uncertainty Measurements 
{w+,w} ( f , c )  [l ,u] 
{W+~ W} 
( f , c )  
[1, u] 
l :  - -  
C : - -  
U 
W + 
W 
W 
w+k 
W + 
w+k 
w++ k 
w+k 
fc 
W +~ k 
1 -c  
c 
w=k 
1-c  
t=# 
u = l - c (1  - f )  
l 
W +~ k 
u- - I  
I - (u  - -  l )  
w=k 
u- l  
l 
f = 1 - (u - l) 
c = 1 - (u - l) 
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be defined in the next section). Actually, any valid (not inconsistent or 
redundant) assignments to any two of the nine measurements (for 
example, w += 3.5 and i = 0.1, or f = 0.4 and l = 0.3) will uniquely 
determine the values of the others. Therefore, the three forms of truth 
value can even be used in mixture. 
To have different, but closely related forms and interpretations for 
truth value (or uncertainty) has many advantages: 
• It give us a better understanding about what a truth value really 
means in NAL1, since we can explain it in different ways. The 
mappings also tell us interesting relations among the various uncer- 
tainty measurements.. 
• It provides a user-friendly interface. If the environment of the 
system is human users, the uncertainty of a statement can be 
represented in different forms, such as "I've tested it w times, and 
in w ÷ of them it was true," "Its past success frequency is f ,  and the 
confidence is c," or "I'm sure that its success frequency will remain 
in the interval [1, u] in the near future." Using the mappings in the 
above table, we can maintain a unique form as the internal repre- 
sentation, and translate the other two into it in the interface. 
• It makes the designing of inference rules easier. For each rule, 
there should be a function calculating the truth value of the 
conclusion from the truth values of the premises, and different 
functions correspond to different rules. As we will see in the next 
section, for some rules, it is easier to choose a function if we treat 
the truth values as weights, while for other rules, we may prefer to 
treat them as ratios or intervals. No matter which form and interpre- 
tation is used, the information carried is actually the same. 
• It is easier to compare the measurements in NAL1 with various 
other approaches to uncertain representation, because different 
forms capture different intuitions about uncertainty. See [38, 39, 41] 
for examples. 
3.3. Grammar 
As an extension of IL, ETL, and ITL, NAL1 can also answer the 
following two types of questions: 
9 
Evaluation. To check a given inheritance relation "S c P," it requires a 
numerical answer, that is, the system evaluates the truth value of the 
inheritance relation, according to available evidence. Now, "I don't 
know" corresponds to the special truth value for "Null evidence," as 
defined before. 
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Selection. To look for a term with an inheritance relation to a given 
term, “? c P” (or “S c ?“) need both a term and an evaluation of 
the truth value of the answer. The system will look for a term T such 
that “T c P” (or “S c T”) has a truth value that make the relation 
“close” to “T c P” (or “S c T”). In the next section, we will define 
the “closeness” accurately. 
In summary, the formal language used by NALl is defined by the 
following grammar: 
(judgment) ::= (term) c (term)(truth-value), 
(question)::= (term) & (term) I ? C (term) I (term) C ?, 
(term) ::= (letter) I (letter)(tenn) I (term)-(term), 
(letter) ::= a 1 b 1 ... I y 12. 
As previously discussed, there are different ways to represent the truth 
value of a judgment. 
For a reasoning system in which NALl is implemented, the language 
can be used both as the “external communication language” (by which 
the system exchanges information with its environment) and as the 
“internal representation language” (by which the memory of the system 
is described). 
4. NONAXIOMATIC LOGIC 1: INFERENCE RULES 
4.1. Validity of the Rules 
Like other reasoning systems, NARS has a set of inference rules that 
derive conclusions recursively from input knowledge. However, the tradi- 
tional definition of validity of inference rules, that is, “to get true conclu- 
sions from true premises,” no longer makes sense in NARS. With insuffi- 
cient knowledge and resources, even if the premises are true with respect 
to the past experience of the system, there is no way to get infallible 
predictions about the future experience of the system-even the premises 
themselves may be challenged by new evidence. 
This does not mean that all answers are equally good for a question. As 
an adaptive system, NARS should answer current questions according to 
past experience. So, in this situation, an inference rule is valid not because 
the conclusions will not be challenged in the future, but because the 
conclusions are summaries of (and only of) the information carried in the 
premises, according to the semantics of the system. 
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A direct implication of the above consequence is that all the inference 
rules are "local rules," in the sense that each rule only takes a constant 
number of premises to get conclusions. In NAL1, all rules take one or two 
judgment(s) as premises. Several authors, for instance Pearl [29], have 
correctly pointed out that such local rules can cause problems by ignoring 
related information, repeated use of correlated evidence, and so on. With 
insufficient resources, ignoring related information is inevitable in each 
inference step. As long as the system can revise the conclusion when the 
related information is taken into account in a future inference step, this is 
not a reason to reject local rules. The fact that the system's resources are 
insufficient itself implies the possibility of ignoring relevant evidence. 
What we need to do, when designing the system, is not to make sure that 
all relevant evidence will be considered when a question is answered, but 
to let the system use relevant evidence as much as possible, under the 
constraints of affordable resources. The problem caused by correlated 
evidence is discussed in the next subsection. 
4.2. Revision 
As discussed above, it is possible (actually it is usually the case) for the 
judgments in the memory of NARS to conflict with each other, in the 
sense that at a certain time, there are two coexistent judgments attaching 
different ruth values to the same inheritance relation, as in the following: 
S c P (w~, wO, 
S c P (w;, w2}, 
where the truth values are represented as weights of evidence. 6 
Such conflicts are caused by the fact that judgments are based on 
different sections of the experience of the system, say E 1 and E 2. In 
principle, we can accurately define the section of experience that a 
judgment is based on: each input judgment is an atomic section of 
experience, and a derived judgment is based on the union of the experi- 
ence sections upon which the premises are based. 
According to the semantics of NAL1, as long as E, and E 2 have no 
common elements, the two bodies of evidence supporting the two judg- 
ments are not correlated with each other (that is, no evidence is counted in 
both the two premises). Therefore, the conclusion derived from the two 
°Unlike in first-order predicate logic, where any conclusion can be derived from a pair of 
propositions that only differ in their truth values, in NAL a conflict is a local problem in that 
not all results are affected. See the subsection on syllogisms (Section 4.4 below). 
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should be 
+ 
S c P {w~ + w2, w 1 "]- W2} , 
where the evidence from different sections of experience is summarized, or 
pooled [41]. 
This sounds easy, but with insufficient resources, NARS cannot maintain 
a complete record of related experience for each judgment, because to do 
this, we would have to assume that, no matter how much space is required 
for the record (the length of an experience section has no upper bound) 
and how much time is required for the processing, it can always be 
satisfied. Therefore the "correlated-evidence recognition problem" cannot 
be completely solved with insufficient resources. Actually, this is also true 
for human beings: we simply cannot exactly remember all evidence that 
supports each judgment we made. On the other hand, the problem must be 
handled somehow; otherwise, as Pearl said in [29], in a bidirectional 
reasoning system, "a cycle would be created where any slight evidence in 
favor of A would be amplified via B and fed back to A, quickly turning 
into a stronger confirmation (of A and B), with no apparent factual 
justification." 
What NAL1 does for the problem is to record only a constant part of 
the related experience for each judgment, and use it to determine whether 
two judgments are based on correlated evidence. 7 Though not perfect, it is 
a reasonable solution when resources are insufficient, and "reasonable 
solutions" are exactly what we expect from a nonaxiomatic system. It is 
also similar to the strategy of the human mind, since we usually have 
impressions about where our judgments come from but such impressions 
are far from complete and accurate. 
4.3. Choice 
What should NAL1 do when two conflicting judgments are based on 
correlated evidence? Ideally, we would like to record exactly the contribu- 
tion of each input judgment, and to subtract he weight of the overlapping 
section from the truth value of the conclusion. Unfortunately, this is 
impossible, because the experience recorded for each judgment is incom- 
plete, as discussed previously. 
The rule that NAL1 uses for the problem is a simple one: to take the 
judgment with a higher confidence (no matter what its frequency is) as the 
conclusion. For an adaptive system, if it must make a choice between 
7In a recent implementation, a "postmark" mechanism is used for this purpose, and it works 
well. See [40] for details. 
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conflicting judgments, the one related to more experience has a higher 
priority. 
Choices are necessary in another situation: among competing answers. 
For a selection question with the form "S c ? ("? c P"  can be similarly 
processed), the system is asked to find a term T (not S itself, of course) as 
a "typical element" in the intension of S. Ideally, the best answer is 
provided by a judgment "S c T (1, 1)" (here the truth value is represented 
by the frequency and confidence of the judgment). However, that is 
impossible, because confidence cannot reach 1 in NAL1. Therefore, we 
have to settle for an answer which is the best the system can find under the 
constraints of available knowledge and resources. 
Assuming the competing answers are 
S c ( f l ,  
S c (f2,c2). 
Which one is better? Let us consider some special cases first: 
1. c a = c 2, that is, the two answers are supported by the same amount 
of evidence (for example, both come from statistical data on 100 
samples). Obviously, the answer with the higher frequency is pre- 
ferred, since that inheritance relation has more positive evidence 
than the other. 
2. f l  = f2 = 1, that is, all available vidence is positive. Now the answer 
with the higher confidence is preferred, since it is more strongly 
confirmed by the experience. 
3. f l  = f2 = 0, that is, all available vidence is negative. Now the answer 
with the lower confidence is preferred, since it is less strongly refuted 
by the experience. 
From the special cases we can see that to set up a general rule to 
compare competing judgments in terms of which is more hopeful to be 
confirmed by the future experience of the system, we need to somehow 
combine the two numbers in a truth value into a single measurement. 
In NAL1, expectation, e is defined for this purpose. Different from a 
truth value (which is used to record past experience), an expectation (of a 
judgment) is used to predict future experience. "e = 1" means the system 
is absolutely sure that the inheritance relation under consideration will 
always be confirmed by future experience, "e = 0" means always refuted, 
and "e -- 0.5" means no preference between a positive prediction and a 
negative one. Intuitively, like subjective probability [21], e can be inter- 
preted as an estimate of a future "inheritance frequency," or a bet that the 
system will accept about a future "inheritance test." Under the assumption 
of insufficient knowledge, in NAL1 e only takes values in (0, 1), with 0 and 
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1 as limits. For a selection question, the system takes the answer that has 
the higher expectation between the competing two. 
To calculate e from ( f ,  c), we can see that under the assumption that 
the system makes predictions according to its (past) experience, it is 
natural to use f as e's "first-order approximation." However, such a 
maximum-likelihood estimate is not good enough when c is small [16]. For 
example, if a hypothesis has been tested only once, nobody will take an 
expectation as 1 (if the test is a success) or 0 (if the test leads is failure). 
Intuitively, e should be more "conservative" (closer to the "no prefer- 
ence" point, 0.5) than f under the consideration that the future may be 
different from the past. Here is where the confidence c affects e: the more 
evidence the system has accumulated--the more confidence the system is 
(indicated by a larger c ) - - the more closely its predicted frequency e will 
be bound to its experienced frequency f. 
Therefore, it is natural to define 
e = c ( f -  0.5) + 0.5. 
Identically, it can be written as c = (e - 0 .5) / ( f  - 0.5) (when f ~ 0.5), so 
it says that c indicates the factor by which f is (to use Good's term in [16]) 
"squashed" to the "no-preference point" to become e. When c = 1 (total 
evidence), e = f; when c = 0 (null evidence), e = 0.5. 
To express the definition of e in terms of the other two forms of truth 
value leads to interesting results. 
When the truth value is represented as an interval, from the mappings 
among different forms of truth value that are listed in Table 3, we get 
e = 0.5(l + u). 
This is exactly the expectation of the future frequency, that is, the midpoint 
of the interval in which the frequency will be in the near future. 
When the truth value is represented as weights of evidence, from the 
mappings we get 
w + + k /2  
e ~ 
w+k 
which is a continuum with k as a parameter. This formula turns out to be 
closely related to Hardy's beta-form-based continuum (with equally 
weighted positive evidence and negative evidence) [16], and Carnap's 
"A-continuum" (with the logical factor, or prior probability equal to ½) [9]. 
Though interpreted ifferently, the three continua share the same formula 
and make identical predictions. All the three continua have Laplace's law 
of succession as a special case (when k = 2), where the probability of a 
next success is estimated by (w++ 1)/(w + 2). 
Now we can see how the choice of the constant k can influence the 
behavior of a system. Let's compare a system A 1 (with k = 1) and a system 
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A 2 (with k = 10). The problem is to make a choice between two competing 
+ , ,  
answers "S c P1 {w~, Wl}" and "S c P2 {w2, w2} (where the truth values 
are represented as weights of evidence). It is easy to see that when 
w~ = w z or w[/w I = w~/w 2, the preferences of the two systems have no 
difference. It is only when a system needs to make a choice between a 
higher f and a higher c that k will matter. For example, when w~- = w 1 = 2, 
+= 5, and w z = 6, A~ will choose the first answer (since all of its wz 
evidence is positive), while A 2 will choose the second answer (since it is 
"better tested," and its frequency is not much lower than the other's). 
Therefore, k is one of the "personality parameters" of a reasoning 
system, in the sense that it indicates certain systematical preference or 
bias, and there is no "optimal value" for it in general. The larger k is, the 
more "conservative" the system is, in the sense that given the same 
amount of evidence, it always makes less change in e than will a system 
with a smaller k. This parameter was called the "flattening constant" by 
Good (see [16], where he also tried to estimate its value), and interpreted 
by him as a way to choose a prior probability distribution. The same 
parameter is interpreted by Carnap as the "relative weight" of the logical 
factor [9]. 
One reasonable alternative for the choice rule is to choose the conclu- 
sion probabilistically. The judgment with a higher confidence (for evalua- 
tion) or a higher expectation (for selection) is not always chosen as the 
answer, but is given a higher probability of being chosen. In this way, the 
decisions are more variable and indeterministic, and so have some advan- 
tages in certain circumstances [18]. 
4.4. Syllogisms 
The major inference rules in NAL1 are the (extended) syllogisms. When 
two judgments share a common term, they can be used as premises to infer 
the inheritance relations between the other two (unshared) terms. 
Altogether, there are four possible combinations of premises and con- 
clusions, corresponding to the four figures of Aristotle's yllogisms: 
1. From "McP  (fl, Cl)" and "S cM (f2, c2)" to get "ScP  ( f ,c ) . "  
This is Aristotle's first figure, and what Peirce called deduction [1, 30]. 
Let us refer to the function that calculates f and c from f~, c~, f2, 
and c 2 as F v 
2. From "P cM (f l ,  Cl)" and "S cM (f2, c2)" to get "ScP  ( f ,c ) . "  
This is Aristotle's econd fgure, and what Peirce called abduction (or 
hypothesis) [1, 30]. Let us refer to the function that calculates f and c 
from fl, Cl, fz, and c2 as F 2. 
3. From "M c P (f l ,  c l )"  and "M c S (f2, c2)" to get "S c P ( f ,  c)." 
This is Aristotle's third figure, and what Peirce called induction [1, 30]. 
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Table 4. 
S c M (t2) 
M c S (/2) 
Inference Rules of NAL1 
M c P 01) P c M 01) 
S c P (F  1) S C P (F2) 
P c S (F~) P c S (F;) 
S cP(F  3) S cP(F  4) 
P c S (F;)  P c S (F'~) 
Let us refer to the function that calculates f and c from fl, c l, fz, 
and c 2 as F 3. 
4. From "M c P ( f l ,  Cl )" and "S c M (f2, c2)" to get "P c S ( f ,  c)." 
This rule, not discussed by Aristotle and Peirce, was called the fourth 
figure by Aristotle's successors [4]. Let us refer to the function that 
calculates f and c from fl,  cl, f2, and c 2 as F 4. 
Considering the conclusions that can be got by exchange the order of 
the premises, we get a complete syllogism table for NAL1, Table 4, where 
F" is the function got by exchanging ( f l ,  Cl) and (f2, c2) in the function 
F i, ( t )  is the truth value of the premise Ji, and (F )  is the truth value of the 
conclusion calculated by F/. 
By extending the truth values and interpreting them both extensionally 
and intensionally, the syllogisms in NAL1 are quite different from Aristo- 
tle's and Peirce's though still related to them. 
The functions in Table 4 can be built by considering the relations among 
the involved truth values in terms of triangular norms (T-norms) and 
triangular conorms (T-conorms). T-norms and T-conorms are functions 
from [0, 1] × [0, 1] to [0, 1] that are monotonic, commutative, associative, 
and with boundary conditions satisfying the truth tables of the logical 
operators AND and OR, respectively [5, 6, 11]. They also can be extended to 
take more than two arguments. 
The usage of T-norm and T-conorm in NAL1 is different from their 
usual usage [6, 11], in which they are used to determine the degree of 
certainty of the conjunction and disjunction of two propositions, respec- 
tively. In NAL1, the T-norm y = T(xi . . . . .  xn) is used when a quantity y 
is conjunctively determined by two or more other quantities x 1 . . . . .  x n, 
that is, y = 1 if and only if x 1 . . . . .  xn = 1, and y = 0 if and only if 
xj = 0 or . . .o r  x, = 0; the T-conorm y = S(xj . . . . .  x n) is used when a 
quantity y is disjunctively determined by two or more other quantities 
x 1 . . . .  ,x,,, that is, y = 1 if and only if x 1 = 1 or.-. or x, = 1, and y = 0 if 
and only if x 0 . . . . .  x n = 0. These quantities are not connected with 
the conjunction or disjunction of two judgments,  
Sin NAL1, the conjunction or disjunction of two judgments i not defined as a judgment. 
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Since the two premises are about two different inheritance relations, 
and the frequency and confidence of a judgment are determined by 
different factors, f l ,  q ,  fz, and c 2 can be referred to as mutually 
independent in the sense that given any three of them, the last one cannot 
be determined, or even bounded approximately. 
Given the ratio interpretations of the truth value and the independence 
among f l ,  cl, .fz, and c 2, it is natural for NAL1 to use the "probabilistic" 
operators (see the comparison of different T-norms and T-connorms 
in [6]): 
T(a ,b )  = ab, S (a ,b )  = a + b - ab. 
T-norms and T-conorms with more than two arguments are defined as 
T(X  1 . . . . .  X n) = T (T (x  1 . . . .  ,X . _a ) ,X . ) ,  
S(x  1 . . . . .  X n) = S(S(x  1 . . . .  ,Xn_ l ) ,Xn) .  
From the point of view of NAL1, "deduction" is the extended "rule of 
transitivity." Only positive evidence for both premises is counted as posi- 
tive evidence of the conclusion, and positive evidence for either of the 
premises is counted as relevant evidence of the conclusion. It follows that 
evidence that is positive for one premise and negative for the other is 
negative evidence of the conclusion, and negative evidence for both 
premises is regarded as irrelevant o the conclusion. Consequently, we 
have the following boundary conditions: 
i if f l - -  1 and f2= 1, 
if f l  = 1 and f2 = 0, 
f=  if f l=0  and f2= 1, 
undetermined if fl = 0 and f2 = 0. 
The confidence of the conclusion is determined conjunctively by the 
amount of relevant evidence and the confidences of the premises; that 
means it is determined by q,  e 2, and S(f l ,  f2), which measures the extent 
to which "at least one premise is positive." Obviously, c is 0 when any of 
the three factors is 0: either one premise is supported by null evidence, or 
the premises are irrelevant o the conclusion, c is 1 only when all three 
factors are 1, though in NAL1 confidences cannot reach 1, but only have it 
as a limit. 
In summary, we get 
T(L , f z )  f l f2  
Fx: f=  
s(f,,f2) fl +A- f ,A '  
c = T (S( f l , f2 ) , c , , c  2) = ( f ,  +f2 - f l f2 )c ,c2"  
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In NAL1, "abduction" is the inference from a shared element M of 
intensions of S and P to determine the truth value of "S c P," and 
"induction" is the inference from a shared element M of extensions of S 
and P to determine the truth value of "S c P." From the symmetry 
between extension and intension, we know that F 2 = F~ (and F 3 = F~). 
Therefore, we only need to discuss one of them, say F 3. 
In determining the truth value of "S c P"  from the common instance M 
of the two terms, the truth values of the two premises have different 
functions. The frequency of "M c P," fl, estimates the frequency of the 
conclusion, since we are taking the property ("having P as part of the 
intension") of a special term M as a property of the general term S. On 
the other hand, f2, Cl, and c 2 conjunctively determine to what extent M 
can be counted as a piece of relevant evidence of the conclusion. At most, 
we can only get one term (indicated by w = 1, according to the interpreta- 
tion of the truth value) in the extension of S as evidence. Therefore, for 
the conclusion, we take w = T(f2, q ,  c2). Writing functions from 
fl, C1, f2, c~ to f and c, we have 
flC1C2 
C 
f1¢1C2 q- k ' 
}73: f=f l ,  
f2C1C2 
C 
f2¢1C2 + k" 
Defined as above, abduction and induction are no longer "inverse 
deductions" [25, 30], and the difference between them and deduction is 
still there: deductive conclusions are usually much more confident [with 1 
as upper bound] than abductive and inductive conclusions [with 1/(1 + k) 
as upper bound]. 9
Using F 2 or F3, we can define NALI's conversion rule. In term logics, 
"conversion" is inference from a single premise to a conclusion by inter- 
changing the subject erm and the predicate term [4]. Now we can see it as 
a special case of abduction by taking "P c S (fo, co)" and "S c S (1, 1)" 
(a tautology) as premises. As a result, we get the truth-value function of 
9Here we can see another function of the personal parameter k: to indicate the relative 
confidence of abductive/inductive conclusions. Comparatively speaking, a system with a small 
k relies more on abduction and induction, while a system with a large k relies more on 
deduction. 
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the conversion rule: 
f "= 1, 
f0c0 
c= 
foCo + k" 
Similarly, we can get the same result by seeing conversion as a special case 
of induction with "P c P (1, 1)" and "P c S (f0, Co)" as premises. 
Now how to understand the conversion rule directly? From our interpre- 
tation of the truth value, we see that the positive evidence for "S c P"  is 
also positive evidence for "P c S," but negative vidence of the former is 
irrelevant to the latter. This means that the conclusion can only be 
confirmed, but never refuted, by such a rule (this is different from the 
cases in ETL and ITL). As a result, we have f = 1 in all situations. As to 
the weight of the conclusion, we know that it is at most 1, and that only 
happens when f0 = Co = 1. In that case, P is in the extensions of both S 
and P. Therefore, we take w = T(fo, co). 
This analysis lead us to the truth-value function of the "fourth figure," 
where we have 
F4: f= l ,  
f lf2¢lC2 
C = 
flf2ClC2 + k '  
That is, just as in the situation for the conversion rule, no negative 
evidence for the conclusion can be collected in this way, and w of the 
conclusion is determined conjunctively by fl,  f2, cl, and c 2. Only when 
flf2clc2 = 1 can the conclusion get support measured by w = 1, since 
then we have "P r- S," that is, P is in the extensions of both S and P. 
There is another interesting result. From "M c P (f l ,  c l )"  and "M c S 
(f2, ¢2)", NAL1 can directly get 
"S c P ( fl' f2clczf2clc2 q*- k )" 
by induction. However, there is also an indirect way to get a truth value for 
"S c P"  from the same premises: first, by conversion, the second premise 
derives 
f2c2 )"; 
"S c M 1, f2c2 + k 
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then, from this judgment and the first premise, NAL1 can get a deductive 
conclusion 
"ScP(f~' f2clc2 ) + k 
Compared with the direct result, the indirect conclusion has the same 
frequency, but a lower confidence. 
Similarly, abduction and the fourth figure can be replaced by conver- 
sion-then-deduction, but with a confidence loss. On one hand, the results 
show that all inference rules in NALI will cause certain information loss 
(though preserving some other information); therefore, direct conclusions 
are more confident. On the other hand, the fact that the same frequency is 
arrived at by following different inference paths shows that the truth-value 
functions are not coined individually in ad hoc ways, but closely related to 
each other, since all of them are based on the same semantic interpreta- 
tion of the truth value. 
4.5. A Summary 
Similarly to IL, ETL, and ITL, the memory of NAL1 can also be 
described as a network, where "c  " is the only type of link, with truth 
value as weight, between nodes (terms). To solve an evaluation question 
means to determine the weight of a link, given its beginning and ending 
node; to solve a selection question means to locate a node with the 
strongest link (that is, the highest expectation) from or to a given node. 
Since by applying rules, both the topological structure of the network and 
the values of the weights can be changed, what the system does is much 
more than searching a static network for the desired link or node. 
The choice rules are for choosing between competing links; the revision 
rule is for merging two links that share both the start and end nodes but 
are supported by distinct bodies of evidence; the conversion rule is for 
reversing a link; and finally, the syllogisms are for chaining two adjacent 
links into a new one, where different combinations of directions corre- 
spond to different types of inference. We can represent hem by the 
patterns in Figure 2, where a link (from subject term to predicate term) 
with a single arrow is a premise, and a link with a double arrow is a 
conclusion (the symmetric onclusions in the syllogisms are omitted). This 
"network interpretation" of NAL1 reminds us of Minsky's comment [26]: 
For the purposes of psychology, we'd better to set aside the dubious ideal of 
faultless deduction and try, instead, to understand how people actually deal with 
what is usual or typical. To do this, we often think in terms of causes, similarities, 
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VA 5s 
(evaluation) (selection) 
Choice ReviJion Convereion 
Deduction Abduction Induction 4th-Figure 
Figure 2. Operations on links. 
and dependencies. What do all these forms of thinking share? They all use 
different ways to make chains. 
We also collect all the functions, in all the three forms of truth value, in 
Table 5. 
It is possible to find direct intuitive justifications for a function in a form 
that is different from the previously discussed ones (for example, Bai Shuo 
in [2] reached the revision rule in the ratio form from a different starting 
point), but such justifications are not always obvious. 
5. AN EXAMPLE 
Up to now, we have completely defined a nonaxiomatic logic, NAL1, 
with its grammar, semantics, and inference rules. 
To get a nonaxiomatic reasoning system, we need to provide a memory 
and a control mechanism, which are adaptive and work with insufficient 
knowledge and resources. A description of the two components can be 
found in [40]. 
In this section, let us see how NAL1 works on an example. 
5.1. Background Knowledge 
The experience of the system, provided by a human user, consists of the 
following judgments: 
(J1) birds c flyers (1, 0.8) 
(.12) doves c birds (1, 0.8) 
(J3) doves c swimmers (0, 0.8) 
(.]4) swans c birds ( 1, 0.8 ) 
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(Js) swans c flyers (1, 0.8) 
(J6) swans c swimmers (1, 0.8) 
(J7) penguins c birds (1, 0.8) 
(J8) penguins c flyers (0, 0.8) 
(J9) penguins c swimmers (1, 0.8) 
The truth values are represented in the "(frequency, confidence)" form. 
To simplify the presentation, only two frequencies appear in the input 
judgments: 1 and 0, corresponding to "all evidence is positive" and "all 
evidence is negative," respectively. All the input judgments are assigned a
confidence value 0.8 by the user. Under the presumption that k = 1 (the 
constant for "near future" defined previously), this means that all the 
judgments are supported by evidence with w = 4 [so c = w/(w + k) = 0.8]. 
5.2. Deduction 
? 
The first question is: "doves c flyers," that is, "Are doves flyers?" From 
J1 and J2, by deduction, the system gets 
(Jlo) doves c flyers (1, 0.64) 
That means, because all available vidence ispositive, the answer is "Yes." 
However, the confidence of the conclusion is lower than either of the 
premises', so it is more easily revised by future evidence. Oenerally 
speaking, all syllogistic inferences cause confidence loss, that is, the confi- 
dence of the conclusion is always lower than the lowest confidence of the 
premises. 
5.3. Induction 
? 
The second question is: "birds c swimmers," that is, "Are birds swim- 
mers?" 
From J4 and J6, by induction, the system gets 
(Jal) birds c swimmers (1, 0.39) 
The conclusion is "Yes," but not confident, compared with the above 
deductive conclusion. If the time supply is very tight, the system will report 
the answer to the user, then turn to other tasks. Otherwise, from J7 and 
J9, the system can get another inductive conclusion: 
(J12) birds c swimmers (1, 0.39) 
Ju and J12 look identical, but since they are supported by distinct bodies 
of evidence, the system can use the revision rule to get a summarized 
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conclusion: 
(J13) birds c swimmers (1, 0.56) 
Though the frequency remains unchanged, the confidence increases, re- 
flecting the accumulation of evidence. 
If the system continues to work on this question, negative vidence will 
be found by an induction from J2 and J3: 
(J14) birds c swimmers (0, 0.39) 
Obviously, it conflicts with J13" Using the revision rule once again, the 
system gets 
(J15) birds c swimmers (0.66, 0.66) 
That means "Most birds are swimmers." Generally speaking, revision 
causes a compromise between the frequencies of the premises (weighted 
by a function of the corresponding confidence), and a monotonic increase 
of confidence. 
Another property of NARS that can be noticed here is: which answers 
are possible are determined by the "logic components" of the system, such 
as the inference rules, but which possible answer is actually reported in a 
certain situation is determined by the "control components" of the system, 
such as the memory structure and resource supply. In this example, Jll, 
J12, J13, J14, and Jls are all possible answers. If they compete with each 
other, Jls will win, because it has the highest confidence. 1° 
5.4. Abduction 
The third question is: "? c birds," that is, to look for a typical type of 
bird. 
At the first glimpse, we can see that J2, J4, and J7 are equally good 
answers for this question. However, if the system can spend more re- 
sources on this question, even the input judgments can be revised by 
taking other evidence into account. 
From J1 and Js, by abduction, the system gets 
(J16) swans  c birds (1, 0.39) 
That is, swans has a property of birds, that is, being flyers; therefore 
"swans c birds" gets some positive vidence. Because J16 and J4 are based 
1°The system will not use J14 and J15 for another revision, because they are based on 
correlated evidence. 
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on different experience sections of the system, they can be combined by 
the revision rule to get 
(J17) swans  c birds (1, 0.82) 
Now the system's belief about "Swans and birds" becomes tabler, as the 
result of considering more evidence. 
Similarly, from J1 and J8, the system gets another abductive conclusion: 
(J18) penguins c birds (0, 0.39) 
Because penguins lack the property of "being flyers," they are not birds, in 
this aspect. When this judgment is used to revise JT, the system gets 
(J19) penguins c birds (0.86, 0.82) 
Now, after summarizing evidence, the system still believes penguins are 
birds, but atypical ones. Because the negative vidence is found by compar- 
ing the properties (intensions) of penguins and birds, the conclusion 
cannot be interpreted extensionally as "86% of penguins are birds." Now 
the frequency value, 0.86, is more similar to the "membership grade" in 
fuzzy set theory or "degree of representativeness" tudied in cognitive 
psychology. 
For doves, the system can do similar inferences. However, since "Doves 
are flyers" is not an input judgment, but a derived one, and in the 
derivation "Doves are birds" has been used, the corresponding abductive 
conclusion cannot be used to revise "Doves are birds," because the 
evidence of the two judgments i correlated. We can see that the problem 
caused by "bidirectional inferences" (discussed in Section 3.2) does not 
appear here. 
As a result, swans will be referred to by the system as a better instance 
of birds than penguins or doves. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The major aim of this paper is to completely define NAL1. Detailed 
comparisons of it with other theories are left for other papers. The most 
important contribution of NAL1 is that it is designed to work in a 
reasoning system which is adaptive, finite, real-time, and open. To do this, 
ideas including term-oriented language, experience-grounded semantics, 
local syllogistic rules, and so on, are invented and applied. 
The most distinguishing features of NAL1 is its ability of uniformly 
representing and processing multiple types of uncertainty (including ran- 
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domness, fuzziness, and ignorance), and doing multiple types of inference 
(including deduction, induction, abduction, and revision). 
The major limitation of NAL1 is in its expressive capacity. With a single 
inheritance relation and atomic terms, NAL1 has problems in representing 
many types of knowledge. However, this limitation belongs to NAL1 only, 
rather than to the NARS project as a whole. Actually, as the simplest 
member of the NAL family, NAL1 is deliberately equipped with a formal 
language that is as simple as possible. It is not designed to be used directly 
for practical purposes, but to be a prototype by which some ideas can be 
demonstrated and tested. In its future extensions, other inheritance rela- 
tions (such as "~ " and "= ") and structured terms (such as the unions, 
intersections, differences, and ordinary relations of terms) will be intro- 
duced, and hopefully the system will become competent in its expressive 
capacity. 
NAL1 is not a "logicist" approach, since it does not use first-order 
predicate logic and model-theoretic semantics, and has nondeductive rules. 
It is still a logic, however, in the sense that it uses a domain-independent 
formal language to represent knowledge, and uses formal rules to capture 
patterns appearing in human reasoning [37]. By naming it a "nonaxiomatic 
logic," I am suggesting that, from the viewpoint of artificial intelligence, 
the problems of the traditional "symbolic AI" [3, 25, 34] are not caused by 
the ideas like "formalization," "symbolization," "logical inferences," and 
so on, but by the ideas like "axiomatization," "computation," "binary 
logics," "consistent and complete system," and other concepts that explic- 
itly or implicitly assume the sufficiency of knowledge and resources. 
Currently, the two classes of ideas are not clearly distinguished. I believe 
the second class is improper for AI, but the first class can still be fruitful. 
In NAL1, all judgments are about "to what extent one term can be used 
as another," and all inferences are about the "can-be-used-as" relation 
(formally defined as the inheritance relation). This reminds us of the 
mathematician Ulam's comment on logic and artificial intelligence: "It is 
the word 'as' that must be mathematically formalized .... Until you do 
that, you will not get very far with your AI problem." Hofstadter discussed 
this opinion in [17], and generalized it into "Ulam's thesis": "AS is the key 
to AI." NAL1 can be seen as a first step in this direction. 
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